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This paper examines the characteristics of earnings quality, reviews the literature 
that assesses whether earnings quality does in fact affect market valuations and 
evaluates whether trading strategies based on this knowledge yield abnormal 
positive returns. This paper looks at why earnings quality should be an important 
consideration in evaluation a firm, then investigates research on the accounting 
effect on valuations, covering the accrual effect, the general growth effect and the 
value-glamour effect. Thereafter, other factors that can influence earnings quality are 
documented, from earnings manipulation to the effects of external factors on quality 
of earnings. The concept and measurement of economic profits are also examined. 
Lastly, trading strategies based on earnings quality are investigated to see if 















Table of Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 2 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ 3 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Why is a focus on the quality of earnings important? ........................................... 6 
Accounting influences on earnings quality and market valuations .............. 11 
Accrual effect ...............................................................................................................................11 
General growth effect ...............................................................................................................16 
Value-glamour effect in disguise ..........................................................................................19 
Defining what can affect quality of earnings .......................................................... 21 
Changes in accounting treatment – earnings manipulation ......................................22 
Changes due to business decisions  (discretionary item changes) ..........................24 
External factors: Variable and cyclical earnings ............................................................25 
Economic profits as an indicator of earnings quality ......................................... 26 
Dividends as a indicator of earnings quality ......................................................... 30 
Does the market price for earnings quality? ......................................................... 31 
Quality of earnings as valuation/trading strategy............................................... 33 
Evidence of long-short strategies based on earnings quality investigated ..........33 
Evidence of short activity in firms with poor e rnings quality? ...............................35 
Insider trading and earnings quality ..................................................................................36 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 39 
















Intuitively, one would think that a firm with superior earnings quality to another would 
be more successful and generate be able to generate more value for shareholders. It 
follows then that ideally investors should seek out firms that exhibit the traits that 
indicate this superior earnings quality and thereby enjoy stock returns that are better 
than the market return.  
 
Earnings quality tends to defined by the characteristics of what improves or detracts 
from the quality of earnings, but a useful starting point is to view earnings quality in 
the context of information risk. Francis et al (2004) note that information risk derives 
from imprecision in estimates of a payoff structure based on available information; 
any uncertainty with respect to returns to investors in the form of either dividends or 
capital gains (encapsulated by free cash flows to common equity) raises information 
risk. Therefore, the higher the information risk, the lower the earnings quality of a 
firm.  
 
Francis et al (2004) identify seven earnings attributes that can be used as proxies for 
information risk: i) accrual quality, where accounting earnings that more closely 
resemble cash earnings are higher quality, ii) persistence: this is how repeatable or 
sustainable earnings are, the more repeatable, the more reliable they are, iii) 
predictability, the more predictable earnings are, the more valued these earnings 
are by investors, iv) smoothness, where Francis et al (2004) argue that earnings 
smoothing eliminates transitory fluctuations, v) value relevance, how much earnings 
explain variability of returns, with greater explanatory power having better information 
content, vi) timeliness, the explanatory power of a reverse regression of earnings on 
returns, vii) conservatism, how well accounting earnings explain economic profits or 
losses (stock price gains or losses). Schipper and Vincent (2003) use a similar 
framework in their discussion of earnings quality.  
 
Earnings quality can therefore be defined as the extent to which cash earnings mirror 
accounting earnings, how likely this is to reoccur in future reporting periods, and how 
easy it is to know ex-ante what the magnitude future earnings will be. Because of this 
earnings quality is a measure of how well earnings explain stock price movements 
and also how volatile a firm’s stock price is relative to its earnings. Lastly, earnings 















The purpose of this paper is to examine these characteristics of earnings quality, 
review the literature that assesses whether earnings quality does in fact affect market 
valuations and evaluate whether trading strategies based on this knowledge yield 
abnormal positive returns. 
 
This paper looks at why earnings quality should be an important consideration in 
evaluation a firm, then investigates research on the accounting effect on valuations, 
covering the accrual effect, the general growth effect and the value-glamour effect. 
Thereafter, other factors that can influence earnings quality are documented, from 
earnings manipulation to the effects of external factors on quality of earnings. The 
concept and measurement of economic profits are also examined. Lastly, trading 
strategies based on earnings quality are investigated to see if abnormal profits can 

















Why is a focus on the quality of earnings important? 
 
Earnings quality is certainly not a new concept. The subject has been investigated 
and discussed for over half a century and as such there is a host of interesting 
literature on the subject. Over time, the literature has incorporated changes in 
accounting treatments and in the trading environment. Sloan (1996) is the reference 
point for most of the subsequent work on the subject of earnings quality. After a 
quarter of a century of intensive work in the subject by many authors, this paper 
attempts to give a critical overview of the state of knowledge in the field for the 
purpose of making it more accessible to the interested reader. 
 
Earnings figures are used by many investors and interested parties as a measure of 
how well a company has performed and how it might perform in the future. Much 
research has been published on the predictability of the cr ss-section of returns 
based on earnings or the use of earnings multiples like PE ratios (price per share / 
earnings per share) in attempting to explain the cross s ction of future returns (Basu 
(1983), Chan, Hamoa and Lakonishok (1991), Fama and French (1992)). 
 
In their seminal work, Ou and Penman (1989) show that prices reflect information 
pertaining to future earnings that is in financial statements with a lag, and suggest in 
that it takes time for the market to appreciate both information about transitory 
current earnings (lower quality earnings) and about future earnings. Therefore, the 
market seems to underutilise the information in accounting statements about future 
earnings, and therefore doesn’t assess the quality of earnings. Sloan (1996) added 
to this, indicating that the information available to investors to assist with 
forecasting/estimating future returns is not optimally or even correctly used. Investors 
tend to focus only on the isolated reported earning metric and fail to take cognisance 
of the quality of the number/metric. 
 
Because of their importance to market participants, earnings should therefore have 
integrity and be reliable in order to give a investors a reliable gauge of the earning 
power of a firm. The comparison of firms’ earnings on an even-footing is also 
important and is supported by Bernstein and Siegel (1979) who note that the 
consideration of various firms’ integrity, reliability and predictability needs to be 















Because this one-dimensional metric is the function of many factors, it is worthwhile 
and prudent to assess the composition of this one number (earnings) to assess 
whether this performance is repeatable or the result of various one-off factors, events 
and/or actions (accounting changes and/or business decisions).  
 
Richardson et al. (2006) support this view and suggest that it is important to analyse 
accounting statements in order to evaluate the financial performance of a firm. While 
accrual based accounting serves the purpose of improving the relevance of financial 
reporting it does sacrifice the reliability somewhat, hence the need for proper 
analysis. 
 
By focusing only on earnings, investors will run the risk of falling foul of potential 
manipulation that might have occurred in order to produce the net income or 
earnings number. This has cost investors severely in the past, with high profile 
corporate failures like Enron, Tyco International and Xerox as examples of earnings 
being inflated through manipulation for long periods, ultimately resulting in large 
losses in value to shareholders. Consequently, Richardson et al. (2006) investigated 
the relationship between accruals and firms falling foul of the SEC for alleged 
earnings manipulation(s) and found high levels of accruals were present for firms 
with alleged earnings manipulation and that these accruals dropped to unusually low 
levels post these manipulations. Chan et al (2006) conclude that by focusing only on 
the bottom line (earnings) important information can be missed and therefore the 
evaluation of quality of earnings will be inadequate. Analysis therefore needs to be 
conducted on accruals in order to understand the magnitude of the gap between 
accounting earnings and cash flows. They show that when earnings rise concurrently 
with the recording of high accruals, i.e. low quality earnings, firms typically exhibit 
poor future returns. 
 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) support this view, arguing that not one of the means of 
measuring earnings can be used in their condensed form for the purposes of making 
forecasts due to the poor informational content thereof. Therefore, any forecasts of 
future earnings, operating income or preferably cash flows of a firm, require 
knowledge and understanding of each of the components of a firm’s financial 
statements 
 
Earnings power is an important concept for investors and speaks directly to the 














the level of earnings an enterprise can be expected to sustain over the next five to 
ten years.  
 
Earnings power is summarised by as Adjusted Earnings multiplied by the inverse of 
the current cost of capital (EPV = Adjusted Earnings x 1/R) (Greenwald et al (2004)). 
The purpose of this valuation exercise is to arrive at an accurate estimate of the 
current distributable cash flow of a company. The quality of earnings is considered 
via a series of adjustments which include: i) removing one-off items or adding 
apparent “one-offs” that actually occur frequently, ii) adjusting reported depreciation 
and amortisation to the amount needed to restore a firm’s assets to the start of the 
year amounts from their year end balances, and iii) adjusting earnings based on the 
company’s position in the business cycle: down if at the peak, up if at the trough (i.e. 
normalised margins and earnings). 
 
These adjustments therefore improve the quality of earnings. This is because the 
adjusted earnings figure is more reflective of the firm’s earnings power, which in turn 
is a reflection of how much these (adjusted) earnings reflect economic reality. The 
smaller this gap is, the better the earnings quality. This then gives investors and 
potential investors a better opportunity to value a company “correctly”. Cornell and 
Landsman (2003) conclude that in order for this to occur, investors must have 
adequate disclosure. This decreased information risk is achieved through improved 
clarity and an appropriate level of detail. Investors will then have the tools 
(information) available to aggregate this information into whatever earnings measure 
they might deem appropriate in order to make valuation assessments.  
 
The cash conversion ratio, defined as cash flow from operations divided by EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation) is another means 
of assessing the level of accruals and accounting “funnies” (changes in accounting 
treatment of items) that might be affecting the quality of earnings. Cash flows from 
operations being all operating income before interest charges, interest income, 
depreciation, amortisation, and all other non-cash charges (including share option 
expenses) and is after working capital changes. By excluding non-cash items, much 
of the potential manipulation of data is excluded, and by including working capital 
changes an assessment can be made as to how much of an accrual effect there is. A 
cash conversion ratio of 100% would indicate a greater quality of earnings than a 
ratio less than 100%, i.e. less of the earnings are as a result of accounting 















Cornell and Landsman (2003) question whether earnings quality is an issue or not. 
Their paper starts by looking at the use of pro forma earnings versus US GAAP 
earnings. The difference between the two is that companies motivate that pro forma 
earnings better reflect their true earning power as opposed to GAAP net income. The 
authors then go on to show that there is no standard composition of pro forma 
earnings. This makes comparability across firms difficult, which is an indication that 
pro forma earnings do not of themselves improve earnings quality. 
 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) provide evidence that the use of one measure (be it 
earnings, EBITDA, etc.) is of little or no use in determining the future value of a 
company. The main thrust of their paper is that differing historic earnings are 
irrelevant in any form; hence any discussion around the quality of the earnings is also 
irrelevant. This, Cornell and Landsman (2003) note, is the earnings quality dilemma. 
 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) look at the results of empirical studies that look at 
specific earnings measures and find that they are mixed owing to a dependence on 
the specific earnings measures that are compared, the time period over which such 
studies have been conducted, and the composition of the sample of companies. 
Because of these mixed results, Cornell and Landsman (2003) reach their conclusion 
of the earnings quality dilemma – that one number/metric cannot be used to 
summarise all historic performance of a firm and be used reliably to forecast future 
performance.  
 
The criticism one can level at this point is that any discussion abut earnings quality is 
precisely the opposite, financial information needs to be disaggregated in order to 
truly assess the quality of earnings of a firm. Individual (or a combination of) metrics 
can then be looked at to assess what is driving earnings quality positively or 
negatively.  
 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) then tie the debate about the quality of earnings to one 
of the functions of capital markets, namely the efficient allocation of capital. Cornell 
and Landsman (2003) argue that for this to happen in an optimal manner, the market 
value of a firm should as much as possible reflect the “true” economic value of the 
firm. And, in order for this to be the case, any forecasts on which such market or 
economic values are based need to be as “accurate” as possible. This supports the 















The solution proposed by Cornell and Landsman (2003) is the use of “clean surplus 
accounting”. Clean surplus accounting means that income (however measured) is 
derived from any changes in the book value of a firm and the addition of net 
dividends. By using this method, the differences that might arise in the calculation of 
net income cancel out in the present value (PV) relationship. Cornell and Landsman 
(2003) point out that all measures of income are of equal quality in a forward-looking 
sense, as long as they satisfy the clean surplus definition and the PV model is used. 
This could be argued from a different perspective: a forecast of future earnings, cash 
flows, etc. would exclude any creative accounting or number manipulation, one-offs 
(unless 100% certainty of forecast) and therefore the forecast earnings would be of a 
higher quality than the historic earnings.   
 
All this research points to the fact that one metric is not appropriate for valuation 
purposes and that a detailed analysis of the quality of earnings (and the components 
thereof) is necessary. The analysis of the multitude of components in financial 
statements and assessment of their quality provides a guide as to what is likely to 
occur in the future and what the risk (likelihood of forecasts not being close to actual 
results) is. 
 
This then leads one to the concept of earnings persistence. The persistence of 
earnings (the likelihood that earnings are repeatable and a reliable indicator of future 
earnings potential) forms the foundation of all aspects and definitions of earnings 
quality. The unpacking and analysis of the single metric, earnings, in the context of 
persistence is at the heart of the research of this topic. This includes the assessment 
of the level of accruals, investigation into earnings manipulation, the cyclicality of a 
firm, and the competitive position it enjoys in an industry.  The question then is 
whether earnings quality has an impact on investment performance or not, and if so 
















Accounting influences on earnings quality and market 
valuations 
 
The main areas of discussion can be divided into three areas. The first includes and 
continues the work of Sloan (1996) and focuses on the question of whether, and to 
what extent, accruals and cash flows affect the value of stocks. The second disputes 
this effect and aims to show that the effect has to do with the general growth effect. 
The third attempts to show that there is no accruals effect, but that this is in fact a 
value-glamour effect. The accrual effect is dealt with first, as Sloan (1996) is the 
reference point from which most of the modern literature relating to earnings quality 
either builds on and adds to, or seeks to disagree with. All three of these areas deal 
with the effect that accounting has on earnings quality, either through management 
choice or owing to prescribed accounting rules. The manipulation of earnings by 




Sloan (1996) is viewed as the seminal study in the field of quality of earnings in 
which he highlights the “accrual anomaly”. He shows that the cash flow component of 
earnings is more persistent than the accrual component of earnings. The anomaly is 
that investors do not seem to take this difference in persistence into account. 
Investors fixate on the current (inflated) earnings with more focus placed on the 
accruals than the cash flows, resulting in the observation that high accrual (low 
earnings quality) firms tend to exhibit poor performance in the future. 
 
Sloan (1996) models the characteristics of the underlying accounting processes 
commonly used for financial statement analysis, assumes that investors might not 
fully discriminate between different components of earnings and then assesses the 
extent of the predictable returns consistent with the returns of the naïve earnings 
expectations model.  Sloan (1996) points out that the results contradict Bernard and 
Stober’s (1989) findings and that the price of stocks will respond to information 
releases regarding the accrual components of earnings and cash flows 
systematically, and therefore the information content of these components are 
systematically different. Sloan (1996) looked at 30 years of financial statements 














excluded banks, life insurance, or property and casualty companies as the data 
source used, Compustat did not have sufficient financial statement data for the types 
of companies to calculate operating accruals. 
 
Sloan (1996) addresses two interesting questions (and two corollary questions) that 
form the basis of much of the debate in future papers of whether earnings quality is a 
predictor of future earnings (and therefore share price) performance.  
 
The first question asked is whether earnings have lower persistence given a higher 
accruals component and lower cash flow component (and vice versa). This tests 
whether current earnings are likely to continue/persist if these (current) earnings are 
as a result of accruals rather than actual cash flows. The results indicate that this is 
indeed the case. Mean reversion (moves in earnings that put them closer to actual 
cash flows) occurred in the ensuing years post measurement date, with earnings 
drifting lower (higher) toward the mean where high (low) accruals were present. 
 
The second question consequently enquires whether the earnings forecasts 
(expectations) manifested as the market values of listed firms are fully reflective of 
the ratio of persistence of earnings between the higher persistence cash flows and 
the lower persistence accruals. This then looks to address the magnitude of any 
mispricing and the direction thereof. His finding suggests that that investors treat the 
accrual component as if it has higher persistence  and the cash flow component as if 
it is less persistent. The magnitude of the mispricing, however, could not precisely be 
inferred as it was sensitive to model specifications.  
 
Lastly, given the above one would expect the abnormal returns to occur once there is 
confirmation of the true quality of earnings. The question is then, are the abnormal 
returns more likely to be grouped around earnings announcement that occur in the 
future? The argument here is: given that any abnormal returns are a result of a 
delayed reaction to “predictable returns” then they should manifest when the 
information confirms this “predictable” change, for example future earnings 
announcements. Sloan (1996) cites the testing of post-earnings announcement drift 
by Bernard and Thomas (1990) who found that almost 40% of the drift is clustered 
around future earnings announcements, but finds that this is unique to quarterly 
earnings changes and that this does appear to be a post-announcement drift in 
annual earnings. Collins and Hribar (2000) confirmed, using quarterly data, that the 














SEC data from 1991 to 2004 and confirmed that the accrual anomaly exists for 
quarterly accruals, observing that firms with extremely high accruals in a particular 
quarter experienced negative future abnormal returns in periods from two days after 
the SEC filing, and that this effect was evident for up to four quarterly earnings 
announcements post SEC filing. 
 
While focusing on accounting accruals, the findings of Chan et al. (2006) confirm 
Sloan’s (1996) findings that accruals are reliably negatively correlated to future stock 
returns. Chan et al. (2006) found that this holds true for longer periods. They looked 
at the share performance for one year after the announcement of financial results 
and found that accruals are reliably, negatively correlated to future stock returns for 
this period. In addition, Chan et al. (2006) found that average returns were 
disappointing for high accrual stocks in years two and three as well. Analysis was 
done at an industry level to make comparisons better. They also ran the tests on the 
UK stock market with confirmatory results.  
 
Sloan (1996) found that listed firms that recorded high accruals, elevating earnings to 
a relatively high level compared to cash flows or put another way, where cash 
conversion is low, have lower returns in subsequent periods, and also underperform 
stocks that have low accruals (higher relative cash conversion). The stocks’ poor 
price performance was found to not have been expected by investors or that 
information in accruals is ignored by investors, that is, that investors seem to “fixate 
on earnings” and that stock react prices react accordingly.   
 
Xie (2001) expands on Sloan’s (1996) work, going beyond total accruals and looks to 
see whether stocks are priced accurately to reflect earnings impacted by abnormal 
accruals (accruals attributable to managerial discretion). In other words, does 
earnings quality, viewed through the lens of abnormal accruals, have an impact on 
valuations? 
 
Abnormal accruals are another term for discretionary accruals. Xie (2001) separates 
the abnormal accruals into those arising from discretionary management behavior 
(earnings management) and those that occur due to unusual business 
circumstances, i.e. those that are non-discretionary, unusual or due to mergers, 
divestitures and acquisitions.  
 














accruals translate into the realisation of cash. Dechow and Dichev (2002) do not 
disaggregate management manipulation (intentional) and accounting (unintentional) 
errors, as they view both of these as low quality accruals and therefore low quality 
earnings. This then ignores Xie’s (2001) conclusion that abnormal accruals (i.e. 
management intervention in accounting) negatively affect earnings quality.  In 
addition, the view of Dechow and Dichev (2002) is that the quality of accruals are 
likely be affected by the volatility of the underlying operations and that this would 
create a greater proportion of estimation errors of accruals which are unavoidable. 
Higher earnings volatility therefore, decreases earnings quality. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) focus on accruals pertaining only to working capital because the realisation of 
cash related to these accruals typically happens within one year of the accrual, 
making the empirical tests easier. Dechow and Dichev (2002)  find that both earnings 
volatility as well as the volatility of accruals, are indicators of earnings and accrual 
quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002)  also confirm that there is a positive correlation 
between accrual quality and earnings persistence. 
 
An investigation by Chan et al. (2006) looked to gain understanding of the effects of 
specific accruals and hence looked at the components of accruals. Chan et al. (2006) 
find that changes to inventory have the most predictive power, while accruals arising 
from changes in accounts receivable and account payable had some ability to predict 
returns, but significantly less than inventory accruals. Building on Jones’ (1991) work, 
Chan et al. (2006)  examined non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Non-
discretionary accruals captured impact of business conditions (via the relation 
between changes in sales growth and working capital changes) while discretionary 
accruals are a reflection of managerial choices and/or manipulation. 
 
Xie’s (2001) study shows the ranking of items affecting persistence and therefore 
quality of earnings. Abnormal accruals are found to be less persistent than normal 
accruals, with cash from operations found to be the most persistent. This consistency 
is carried through to the conclusions on the valuation effect of abnormal accruals 
(degree of quality of earnings). The finding is that the market misprices these 
accruals. In other words, firms that have abnormally high accruals and therefore poor 
earnings quality, tend to be overvalued by the market. The results are consistent with 
Sloan (1996), and provide some granularity into the effects of earnings quality on 
valuation. 
 














therefore affected stocks tend to be over-priced. Given the ranking mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, abnormal accruals are overestimated more severely than 
normal accruals and therefore have a more pronounced effect on valuation with Xie 
(2001) concluding that the overpricing of normal accruals is not material while it is 
significant for abnormal accruals.  
 
In a very roundabout way Dechow and Dichev (2002) confirm Sloan’s (1996) finding 
that the accrual portion of earnings is less persistent than the cash flow component, 
and therefore firms with a high level of accruals will tend to have a low quality of 
earnings. They argue that while a high level of accruals improves earnings, versus 
purely recording cash flows, this high level of accruals creates an situation where 
these earnings are likely to be of low quality. This is because, by their nature, a high 
level of accruals would occur with different timing to actual cash flows. This mismatch 
between cash flows and accruals creates a strong likelihood of estimation errors.   
Dechow and Dichev (2002) find a positive correlation between the levels of accruals 
and the size of the these estimation/mismatch errors. This then causes the earnings 
quality to be compromised, resulting in less persistent, and therefore low quality, 
earnings.  
 
Richardson et al. (2006) build on the work done by Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and look to show that the lower persistence in the 
accrual component of earnings was as a result of temporary accounting distortions. 
They define accruals more comprehensively than prior papers by including all 
operating accruals (both current and non-current excluding the more reliable (and 
therefore more persistent) financing accruals. Prior papers typically define accruals 
















General growth effect 
 
Fairfield et al. (2003) suggest that that the Sloan (1996) accrual anomaly, where 
investors ignore what is implied by accruals and their impact on future profitability of 
a firm is a unique case of what is in fact the general growth anomaly: that the low 
persistence of accruals and the consequent mispricing thereof is rather due to the 
growth in net operating assets.  
Fairfield et al. (2003) cite Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) to support 
the view that the future profitability and value of a firm is reliant not only on current 
profitability (how this profit was generated) but also on the growth in the net operating 
assets of the firm. Assets are required to generate revenue and profits, but any 
growth thereof would result in diminishing marginal returns. Therefore they look 
further than the relationship between accruals (as defined as changes in non-cash 
working capital less depreciation) and cash flows from operations and their effects on 
profitability to the effects of accruals and growth in long-term net operating assets on 
growth in net operating assets (i.e. non-current balance sheet accounts). Profits are 
defined as the current period return on assets (ROA).  
What this means is that, assuming current earnings of a firm, then one year ROA 
would be depressed by any growth in the net operating assets. Fairfield et al. (2003)  
explain that this is due to both conservative accounting principles as well as the 
diminishing marginal returns on increased investments that tend to reduce 
profitability for growing firms. Fairfield et al. (2003) show that this is the case: that 
one year forward ROA is negatively associated with the growth in net operating 
assets, both the growth in accruals (growth in current net operating assets) and the 
growth in long-term net operating assets.  
Diminishing marginal returns on increased investment arise due to firms first 
undertaking the most profitable projects first (highest internal rate of return) and then 
will allocate capital in descending order until all projects with positive net present 
values have been taken advantage of. Therefore each incremental allocation of 
capital (increase in net operating assets) should generate a lower return than the 
prior project (diminishing marginal return). 
Accounting conservatism results in more capital allocation being recognized up front. 
Therefore returns in the early part of a project will appear lower and in the latter 















Fairfield et al. (2003) find that the market tends to overvalue both growth in long-term 
net operating assets and accruals (with no significant statistical difference between 
these two factors) as measured by these factors’ effect on ROA. Fairfield et al. 
(2003) view this as a result of both conservative accounting and diminishing marginal 
returns on investment. This leads to their conclusion that Sloan’s (1996) accrual 
anomaly effect is a special case of what can be viewed as a more general growth 
anomaly. The point to note here is that the market once again ignores the economic 
reality of reported numbers. 
The view of Fairfield et al. (2003) is that the low persistence of accruals is less likely 
to be due to earnings manipulation by management but is rather due to an 
accounting distortion caused by the conservative bias in accounting principles as well 
as the interaction of firm growth with the lower rates of economic profits associated 
with diminishing marginal returns to increased investment. This then explains 
earnings quality in terms of both accounting distortions and economic growth. 
 
Richardson et al. (2006) split accruals into a “growth” component and an “efficiency” 
component. The growth component was defined as the accruals that relate to growth 
in output. The efficiency component pertains to those accruals unrelated to the 
growth in output: the changes in the efficiency with which existing investments are 
employed. 
 
They define total operating accruals (ACC) as the change in net operating assets 
(NOA) deflated by the lagged operating assets. Efficiency is defined in terms of the 
standard net operating asset turnover ratio (AT). The decomposition is shown 
algebraically below: 
 
ACCt  = NOAt / NOAt-1  
= Salest / Salest-1 - ATt / ATt    - (Salest / Salest-1) * ATt / ATt) 
   
 = Sales growth   - Change in Efficiency   - Interaction 
 
This formula allows one to see the two determinants of accruals. Firstly, sales growth 
directly influences accruals. The authors point out that if asset efficiency remains 














make is that accruals are negatively related to efficiency. Without sales growth, a 
reduction in asset efficiency will lead to the proportional increase in accruals. The 
interaction term allows for situations where sales growth and efficiency changes are 
correlated; positive correlation would occur in instances of economies of scale while 
a negative is likely where new investment starts to generate diminishing marginal 
returns. 
 
The purpose of isolating the growth component is to measure the effects of 
diminishing marginal returns on increased investment. Richardson et al. (2006) find 
that both the growth and efficiency components contribute to lower persistence in 
earnings (lower quality earnings) and conclude that these diminishing marginal 
returns to new investment do not provide a complete explanation for this lower 
persistence of accruals, contradicting Fairfield et al. (2003). Richardson et al. (2006) 























Value-glamour effect in disguise 
 
Taking an opposite direction to Fairfield et al. (2003), Desai et al. (2004) look to see 
how the accruals anomaly introduced by Sloan (1996) is related to the value-glamour 
anomaly. Desai et al. (2004) then point out that market is unable to process 
accounting information in both anomalies, leading to mispricing of securities and 
therefore look to see whether there is commonality in these effects. This “anchoring” 
by investors does seem to be at the crux of the abnormal returns that can be earned 
by anticipating this behavioural bias, whether it be by looking at value stocks or 
looking at the earnings quality of a firm.   
 
The valour-glamour anomaly is the outperformance of value stocks versus glamour 
stocks. Value stocks are defined as those that have low fundamental to price ratios, 
for example low price-to-book (P/B), low price-to-earnings (P/E) or low price to cash 
flow (P/C) ratios. Firms exhibiting these traits (value stocks) tend to outperform firms 
with the opposite metrics, high P/E glamour stocks. One school of thought and 
research of the reasons for this effect suggests it is due to investors failing to 
appreciate and anticipate the mean-reversion of glamour stocks downwards, 
extrapolating the continuation of stellar returns and being negatively surprised. When 
value stocks deliver higher than expected returns the excess return is positive. Fama 
and French (1996) offer the alternate reason: that value firms outperform glamour 
firms because they are riskier, and therefore higher returns are received in order to 
compensate for this risk.  
 
Desai et al. (2004) find, after controlling for the traditional four value-glamour ratios:  
sales growth, P/B, P/E, and P/C (where C is earnings after adding back 
depreciation), that accruals are related to future returns (in support of the evidence 
thus far in this paper). This is a positive correlation: low accruals are related to higher 
future returns, and high accruals tend to have lower future returns.  
 
Desai et al. (2004) then look at a new variable, operating cash flows in relation to 
price (CFO /P). CFO is defined by Desai et al. (2004) as earnings plus depreciation 
less working capital accruals. They argue that the traditional P/C does not sufficiently 
exclude managerial discretion and that by factoring in the working capital accruals, 















The results of Desai et al. (2004) lead them to conclude that CFO incorporates all the 
mispricing attributable to all the other value-glamour proxies and that after controlling 
for P/CFO, accruals are not related to future returns. This is certainly logical: sales 
growth is positively correlated with accruals, so a firm with a high level of accruals is 
likely to exhibit high sales growth, and therefore be viewed as a glamour stock (and 
vice versa). Accruals are negatively correlated with operating cash flows – so a firm 
with high accruals is likely to have a high P/C ratio and be view as a glamour stock.  
 
Desai et al. (2004) offer two interpretations of their results. Firstly, if one rejects the 
expanded P/CFO measure, and prefers to use only the traditional P/C metric as a 
means of evaluating the value-glamour effect, then the accruals anomaly is not the 
value-glamour effect in disguise. Desai et al. (2004) submit that this then makes the 
P/CFO a comprehensive measure in predicting future stock returns, doing away with 
the need for assessing accruals and traditional value-glamour variable. The second 
interpretation Desai et al. (2004) submit is that if one accepts the P/CFO as a proxy 
for all other traditional value-glamour variables, then the conclusion is that the 
accruals anomaly is in fact this expanded value-glamour effect in disguise. 
 
While the debate presented around the value-glamour effect is interesting, it is 
important to draw back to the title of this paper, quality of earnings as an investment 
indicator. The question at the essence of this is whether earnings are reliable, 
sustainable, repeatable and not as a result of external events.  
 
The metric P/CFO proposed by Desai et al. (2004) certainly appears to capture 
elements of earnings quality by factoring in the effects of depreciation and working 
capital accruals. Desai et al. (2004) also do not disagree with prior research of the 
impact that accruals have on the quality of earnings and the interpretation by the 
market (or rather the lack thereof) and the subsequent abnormal returns that are on 
offer. So while Desai et al. (2004) offer an explanation in the context of the value-
glamour effect, the results support the argument that earnings quality is positively 















Defining what can affect quality of earnings 
Richardson et al. (2006) point out that the provision of useful information to investors 
is the primary objective of financial accounting. As shown in earlier parts of this 
paper, cash earnings have greater persistence than accruals and therefore are a 
better gauge of a firm’s financial performance. However, accrual accounting is the 
method utilised in the presentation of financial statements under IFRS and GAAP, 
and has the purpose of matching revenues to expenses (matching principle) and on 
the balance sheet side, recording assets and liabilities via changes in non-cash 
assets and liabilities via the accruals. The goal is to reflect the economic reality of a 
firm. Richardson et al. (2006) criticise the current drive by those who set accounting 
standards toward "fair value" accounting. Their view is that the frequency and size of 
accounting distortions will be increased which will result in a reduction in the quality 
of reported earnings in the form of lower persistence and less reliability. 
 
This is, however, an area where much manipulation can and does occur, which can 
lead to false signals about the financial performance, both historic and future, of a 
firm. As has been shown by Sloan (1996), Richardson et al. (2006), Xie (2001) and 
Chan et al. (2006), accruals are not interpreted correctly by market participants, 
thereby overvaluing firms with high accruals (poor quality earnings) and undervaluing 
firms with high quality earnings (low accruals). 
 
This neatly frames the entire debate. A decrease in accruals quality must lead to a 
decrease in the quality of earnings in order for the formula to hold. This then justifies 
focus of the research on accruals as an indicator of earnings quality and where much 
of this literature review has concentrated. Typically these are influenced by 
management intervention, i.e. changes in accounting treatment. The other factor that 
can affect earnings quality is cash flow. This can be affected by changes in business 
decisions and external factors. 
 
It is therefore worthwhile to examine what can affect the quality of earnings, how and 
if accruals are manipulated (whether poor accrual estimation or managerial 
manipulation) and other business or industry factors that might affect the earnings 
quality of a firm. In this literature review, an attempt is made to cover the main areas 
that can affect earning quality, namely i) changes in accounting treatment, ii) 
changes due to business decisions, and iii) external factors. It is recognised that this 














research, intuitively and through my experience as an investor as having influence on 
investment quality. 
Changes in accounting treatment – earnings manipulation 
 
Accounting treatments can be changed which will affect the quality of earnings: these 
include recognising revenues and expenditures either early or with a delay, or 
choosing a less conservative accounting method versus a more aggressive one.  
 
By recognising for example, revenues early or adopting aggressive assumptions on 
say, pension fund liabilities, the downside risk would be increased, thereby reducing 
the quality of future earnings. If a construction company’s project revenues are 
recognised in full before project completion, there is the likelihood that these will be 
reduced due to late delivery penalties. If the actuarial assumptions underlying the 
calculation of pension fund liabilities are too aggressive, there is a likelihood that the 
future liabilities will be underestimated, with the resultant negative impact on future 
earnings. Another example would be the lengthening a depreciation term versus 
industry norm for a particular asset or assets. These are all forms of changing 
accruals that affect the quality of earnings, which, as shown later in this paper, affect 
the future value of the firm. 
 
Temporary accounting distortions are discussed by Richardson et al. (2006) and they 
show how these play a significant role on explaining poor quality earnings. Because 
accruals are a representation of the estimation of future benefits and obligations, an 
element of estimation error must exist in accruals that is far greater than the receipt 
or pay out of actual cash. They use the accrual of the allowance for uncollectible 
amounts on credit sales as an example. Only when actual collections are known, will 
the actual estimation error be known. The larger the accruals, the greater the 
estimation error, and therefore the lower the earnings quality will be. This temporary 
accounting distortion is an area where management manipulation of earnings is likely 
to be evident.  
 
Chan et al. (2006) looked at earnings manipulation and the effect thereof on earnings 
quality and stock returns.  Chan et al. (2006) find that there is asymmetry in earnings 
manipulation, i.e. there is more likelihood that accruals will be increased to 
















Chan et al. (2006) show that extreme accruals tend to be reversed quite quickly in 
the following financial year with growth in sales and earnings slowing down (relative 
to total assets) a year after the corresponding extreme rise in accruals. Chan et al. 
(2006) caution that if there earnings improve at the same time as an increase in 
accruals (and the corresponding decrease in cash flows), then this should be taken 
as an advance warning that future operating performance will be compromised. 
 
Interestingly, Chan et al. (2006) found that firms with low accruals do not appear to 
manipulate earnings lower as one might expect, i.e. write off bad debts and obsolete 
inventory when there is sufficient earnings to absorb these losses.  The observation 
of Chan et al. (2006) is that unlike poor earnings quality firms, firms with the lowest 
accruals tended to exhibit declines in sales and earnings at the same time the low 
accruals. Chan et al. (2006) suggest that firms might be reducing their earnings 
(through lower accruals) when there is some certainty that the poor top line 
performance is nearing an end and that sales growth is likely to improve. By 
decreasing accruals (lowering earnings further) these firms will exhibit even more 
substantial improvements to future earnings. Once again it is shown that market 
participants do not anticipate this pick-up in earnings due to the accrual effect. 
 
Richardson et al. (2006) looked at the relationship between accruals and firms falling 
foul of the SEC for alleged earnings manipulation(s). Richardson et al. (2006) show 
that such firms exhibit abnormally high levels of accruals at the time of the alleged 
earnings manipulations and unusually low accruals post these manipulations. The 
conclusion that Richardson et al. (2006) reach is that this is a reflection of 
management manipulation of earnings in order to discretionally distort the accounting 
records in order to inflate accruals (temporarily) and thereby inflate earnings. This 
finding provides an interesting instance of Xie’s (2001) conclusion that the distortion 
of accounting items due to earnings management is found to cause the lower 
persistence of earnings.  
 
This is further supported by Beneish and Vargus (2002) who show that firms where 
there is abnormally high insider selling, tend to have income-increasing accruals as a 
result of aggressive accounting choices, for example lower depreciation charges and 
















As a example of management manipulation of earnings, Livant and Santiccha (2006) 
describe “channel stuffing”, a practice of inflating sales by sending more product to 
its clients than would ordinarily be required. This serves the purpose of inflating sales 
in the period concerned. Accruals would be inflated due to accounts receivable being 
abnormally high. The effect of this is either less stock being taken by clients in the 
subsequent period, or returns of stock, both of which would detract from earnings in 
subsequent periods due to sales being lower. This inflation of accruals (trade 
receivables) is clearly then an indication of poor quality earnings.  
 
It is not necessarily only through the manipulation of the accounting that earnings 
quality can be negatively affected. From time to time discrete, one-off events that are 
not in the course of ordinary business occur and must be recorded. These include 
restructuring charges, write-offs, sale of a business unit, sale of assets, insurance 
claims, etc. due their temporary nature, these would distort the earnings figure and 
therefore the quality of earnings. 
 
Platikanova (2008) provides interesting evidence of earnings manipulation declining, 
earnings quality therefore improving, and a consequent positive effect on the market 
value of a firm. The study looks for reasons why, when companies are added to the 
S&P500, a significant, positive abnormal return is typically generated for the 
company concerned: “the index effect”. Platikanova (2008) looks at the earnings 
quality of companies pre- and post- inclusion into the S&P500 and find that 
discretionary accruals decrease after inclusion. The author concludes that this 
enhancement of earnings quality is a possible contributor to the positive price 
response 
Changes due to business decisions  (discretionary item changes) 
 
Controlling net income through management action by increasing or decreasing 
discretionary expenses (deferring maintenance capital expenditure will decrease 
depreciation, deferring vehicle purchases, delaying repairs, reducing advertising and 
marketing expenditure, reducing training and development for staff, reduced 
research and development. These actions, while improving earnings in the short-
term all would reduce the quality of earnings as they, are likely to reduce the 
likelihood of superior long term earnings (Bernstein & Siegel, 1979). Delaying repairs 
and maintenance could reduce production efficiency, negatively impacting return on 














have a dampening impact on future sales and reduced training and development of 
staff is likely to reduce productivity and competitiveness of employees relative to 
competitors. 
 
Livant and Santiccha (2006) give a good example of management action (not 
manipulation) that can have a negative impact on earnings quality. This is where 
management is overly optmistic about future sales growth and builds up very large 
inventory holdings. Because this is not expensed, earnings in the year this occurs will 
be artificially high. The degree to which future sales do not meet these inventory 
levels, will determine the amount of inventory write-down that needs to occur: the 
larger the mismatch, the greater the impact on earnings in future periods. This is the 
same as the concept of temporary accounting distortions raised by Richardson et al. 
(2006) which was discussed previously.  
External factors: Variable and cyclical earnings 
 
The ability to be able to forecast earnings with some degree of certainty is more 
desirable than trying to predict a volatile earnings stream. Firms that have no control 
over the price of their product and do not have a high degree of variable costs would 
generate an earnings stream of poor quality.  
 
High levels of gearing will create volatility due to the effects of both positive and 
negative leverage. The potential for these swings therefore makes a firm with a high 
level of gearing have a lower quality of earnings than a lower geared firm.  
 
Businesses that are in cyclical industries have lower earnings quality than those in 
defensive industries. Examples of cyclical industries would be those exposed to 
commodities or to interest rate moves.  
 
Establishing historically the persistent portion of earnings for high growth companies 
is of marginal value according to Cornell and Landsman (2003). However, this does 
include an assessment of the quality of the earnings though. As long as one is able 
to separately value the persistent portion of earnings and understand what the value 
of the growth portion of a company is, then an understanding of the quality both the 
persistent and the growth earnings is important. An assessment of the quality of both 
these future earnings streams is crucial in understanding the variability of returns 















Economic profits as an indicator of earnings quality  
 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) discussed the earnings quality dilemma. Their 
conjecture is that debate about earnings quality in fact targets a more fundamental 
issue: the efficient allocation of capital in a properly functioning capital market. 
Cornell and Landsman (2003) argue that for this to happen in an optimal manner, the 
market value of a firm should as much as possible reflect the “true” economic value 
of the firm. And, in order for this to be the case, any forecasts on which such market/ 
economic values are based need to be as “accurate” as possible. 
 
This then introduces the concept of earnings quality in the context of economic 
profits. Schipper and Vincent (2003) point out low quality earnings produce a 
defective resource allocation signal: economic growth will be reduced due to capital 
being misallocated to low quality earnings firms. Fairfield et al. (2003) reasoned that 
diminishing returns on net operating assets are a contributing factor to the low 
persistence in earnings as well as conservatism in accounting, manipulation of 
accounts and manipulation of earnings through the control of expenditure and capital 
expenditure.  
 
The concept of diminishing marginal returns and true returns on true economic value 
leads one into the concept of economic profits as a tool to assess the quality of 
earnings. Schipper and Vincent’s (2003) discussion on earnings quality is framed 
within the economics-based definitions of earnings developed by Hicks (1939), 
where Hicksian income “corresponds to the amount that can be consumed (that is, 
paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving a firm equally well off at the 
beginning and the end of the period”. In other words, this income is the change in net 
economic assets after transactions with shareholders. Earnings quality, under this 
framework, is evaluated by the degree to which earnings that are reported 
correspond to Hicksian income. This definition allows one to evaluate quality without 
the constraints of accounting rules and management manipulation.  
 
This concept of economic profits is utilised in practice via, amongst others, Stern 
Stewart’s economic value added (EVA®),measured via ROIC, and HOLT's cash flow 
return on Investment, CFROI ®.  
 














CFROI = (Adjusted EBIT x (1-tax rate) + Depreciation & Other Non-cash charges) / 
Capital Invested 
 
The adjustments made to EBIT are outlined below, but serve to reveal the true 
quality of earnings after adjusting for any expenses that are actually capital in nature 
and any financing expenses.  Capital invested is discussed below. 
 
EVA® is defined as Return on invested capital (ROIC) less cost of capital. Where 
ROIC is greater than cost of capital, positive economic profits have been generated, 
indicating a growth in the value of the firm. In the opposite case where ROIC is less 
than the firm’s cost of capital, the economic losses would be destroying firm value. 
Put another way, in an economic loss situation, the quality of earnings can be said to 
be poor, i.e. assets are not generating sufficient returns.  
 
Both these methods look to undo the conservatism in accounting and remove and 
manipulations that might have occurred in order to assess how well capital has been 
employed in an economic sense, which one would argue is a better measure of the 
quality of earnings. The intent and philosophy of both methods are similar, with the 
CFROI® methodology factoring in inflation on historical assets.  
 
The formulae below link net operating assets to Invested Capital (IC).  
 
Net operating Assets (NOA) = Operating assets – Operating liabilities 
 
Operating assets includes both current assets (accounts receivable, inventory, etc.) 
and non-current operating items like property, plant and equipment. Both these items 
would have accruals as part of their composition. Excluded from operating assets 
would be financial assets like cash and long-term investments.  
 
Operating assets = Total Assets – (Cash + Investments)  
 
Operating liabilities exclude the non-operating liabilities (financial liabilities) such as 
long- and short-term debt. Operating liabilities includes accounts payable and leases, 
where once again accruals and also accounting conservatism can play a role 
(through recording disproportionately more capital up front, depressing returns in the 















Operating liabilities = Total Liabilities – Total Debt 
 
Substituting in the above: 
 












NOA = Shareholders’ Equity + Total Debt – Cash – Investments  
 
This is also referred to as Invested Capital  (Damodaran, 2006). 
 
The point of the decomposition of NOA is to highlight the areas where the quality of 
earnings can be affected through the balance sheet.  
 
The ROIC® and CFROI® methodologies also make adjustments to the income 
statement items (the numerator) to better approximate economic profits and thereby 
improve the earnings quality. 
 
As highlighted by Fairfield et al. (2003), accounting conservatism results in more 
capital allocation being recognized up front. Therefore returns in the early part of a 
project will appear lower and in the latter stages of a project will expand. Therefore 
ROA in the first few years will be biased downwards.  
 
Richardson et al (2006) refer to this as a permanent accounting distortion, as it 
results from the consistent application of biased accounting methods. Richardson et 
al (2006) use the example of the requirement to expense research and development 














and development cost, removing this distortion. Similarly, operating leases are 
capitalized. 
 
Also, CFROI® (because of its inflation adjustment) allows comparisons across 
companies, industries, countries and different accounting methods, US GAAP and 
IFRS, thereby improving the quality of earnings. 
 
The point to note with EVA®, is that will there is a positive correlation between EVA® 
and firm value, the relationship is not as clear between EVA® and market value 
changes. In the context of earnings quality as an investment indicator, this has some 
implications worth considering. The market value of a firm does not only reflect he 
expected EVA® of current operations and assets of a firm, but also the expected 
EVA® from future projects.  
 
Market returns are determined by how much EVA is actually delivered versus how 
much EVA was expected by the market. Where this meets expectations, returns will 
not be greater than the market. Where EVA beats expectations, excess returns are 
likely, while a below expectation EVA would be a negative surprise and result in 
substandard market returns. The negative outcome could be in spite of a firm 
delivering positive EVA. The key determinant appears to be the non-meeting of 
expectations. The HOLT system attempts to quantify this market expectation in order 
for optimal investment strategies to be implemented. 
 
There are also instances where EVA can be of low quality and therefore a poor 
indicator of future performance. Circumstances under which this would be the case 
include high growth firms, where most of the value is derived from future from 
operations, cyclical companies, firms where leverage is not stable, and firms where 
management actions can alter the risk profile of the firm. These circumstances share 















Dividends as a indicator of earnings quality 
 
Skinner (2004) looked to see if dividends provide information about the equality of 
earnings as measured by persistence of earnings. As has been shown already in this 
paper, greater persistence indicates greater earnings quality. Dividend theory would 
suggest that part of the basis for a firm’s dividend declaration is an evaluation of how 
sustainable its earnings in the medium to long-term will be. Because high quality 
earnings would exhibit good persistence, it should follow that dividend policy and 
earnings should have a good correlation. The investigation by Skinner (2004) looks 
at long term S&P data from 1871 to 2002.  
 
The results of Skinner (2004) indicate that dividends do provide information about 
future earnings. This informational content is in addition to any information that 
current earnings convey. Skinner (2004) finds that firms that pay dividends have a 
stronger relationship between current and future earnings, than firms that don’t. The 
size of the dividend was also important: firms that pay large dividends tended to have 
higher earnings quality. The size of the dividends is measured as the pay-out ratio.  
 
Skinner (2004) also finds a size effect: large firms that pay large dividends have 
higher earnings quality than either large firms that don’t or smaller firms that pay 

















Does the market price for earnings quality? 
 
 As already pointed out in this paper, previous research suggests that one metric is 
not appropriate for valuation purposes and that a detailed analysis of the quality of 
earnings is necessary. The analysis of the multitude of components in financial 
statements and assessment of their quality provides a guide as to what is likely to 
occur in the future and what the risk (likelihood of forecasts not being close to actual 
results) is. 
 
The question that then comes to mind is, how does one protect against future, 
unknown instances of sudden changes in earnings quality? A company that that 
historically has made accounting adjustments, or made short-term business 
decisions to improve earnings, or is a business in a cyclical industry, is likely to 
continue with these practices. Therefore, while any forecast of earnings is likely to 
exclude these factors, the likely outcome is that actual future earnings are likely to 
contain one or more of these factors, thereby continuing the trend of poor quality 
earnings. The obvious place then to factor in this forecast risk is in the discount rate 
applied to the PV calculation.  
 
One means of incorporating this risk in a valuation context would be through an 
appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. An easy example of this would be a cyclical 
company. A cyclical company would have a higher beta than the market. Using 
CAPM, the cost of equity would be higher, resulting in the PV being lower, all other 
things equal, than a defensive company. 
 
Academic support for this view is provided Francis et al. (2004). Their investigation of 
seven attributes of earnings: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, 
value relevance, timeliness and conservatism found that companies exhibiting the 
negative or poor rating for each of these attributes, when examined individually, tend 
to have higher costs of equity. In particular, firms with poor accrual quality exhibit the 
largest effect of cost of equity (upward). Applying these higher costs of equity to a 
valuation model would result in a lower equity value, or put another way, poor quality 

















Francis et al. (2005) looked at the market pricing of firms total cost of capital, both 
equity and debt, in relation to the earnings quality of a firm and found an inverse 
relationship. Low quality firms tended to have higher betas (a difference in spread of 
0.23 to 0.51 between the lowest and highest quintiles) which translates to a 150-300 
basis point higher cost of capital for poorer earnings quality firms. Low earnings 
quality firms also suffered from relatively lower debt ratings; firms with the lowest 
earnings quality tended to attract 80-160 basis point higher costs of debt relative to 
firms with the highest earnings quality. Evidence of the pricing of the systematic 
component of earnings quality is supported by the results of a study by Aboody et al. 
(2005). 
 
Francis et al. (2005) do not separate the effects of management manipulation (on 
accounting or business decisions), the characteristics of a particular firm or industry 
or the effects of the economic environment on the business as the earnings quality 
metric used capture all these effects. Therefore, their results reflect the effect of the 
overall earnings quality of a firm, as allocated by the capital market. Their 
interpretation is that earnings quality is a non-diversifiable information risk factor, 
much the same as size or book-to-market factors and it is priced accordingly by 
investors.  
 
These findings support a theme in this paper, that lower quality earnings are by their 
definition, more risky (less likely to be repeated) and have poor information content. 
The improvement of the information content of earnings through more precise 
accounting information and lower accruals (earnings approximate cash flows) will 
















Quality of earnings as valuation/trading strategy 
Evidence of long-short strategies based on earnings quality investigated 
 
Sloan (1996) enquires if earnings expectations embedded in stock prices fully reflect 
the higher earnings persistence attributable to the cash flow component of earnings 
and the lower earnings persistence attributable to the accrual component of 
earnings? This then looks to address the magnitude of any mispricing and the 
direction thereof. Sloan (1996) finds that investors appear to treat the accrual 
component as if it is more persistent and the cash flow component as if it is less 
persistent. The magnitude of the mispricing, however, could not precisely be inferred 
as it was sensitive to model specifications.  
 
If this would hold true, would a trading strategy of taking a long position in shares that 
have low accruals and short positions in shares with high accruals generate positive, 
abnormal returns? Conversely, does a strategy of going long shares with high cash 
flows relative to earnings and short firms with low cash conversion generate positive, 
abnormal returns? This is an extension of the second question: what is the 
magnitude of mispricing due to accruals and the direction thereof? If investors fixate 
on current earnings and the current stock prices do not reflect the quality of earnings, 
then a simple long-short trading strategy should yield positive, abnormal returns. 
Sloan found this to be the case, even after accounting for the Fama and French 
(1992) variables of size, book-to-market, historical beta and earnings-to-price. Sloan 
(1996) does note, however, that there are practical hurdles to overcome in 
implementing such a strategy. These include information acquisition costs, 
processing costs, the limits due to price pressure effects and the potential that 
sufficient quantities of stock may not be available to optimise the strategy. He 
concludes that possibly the returns observed in the test just are the normal returns 
that an active investment strategy based on fundamental analysis might achieve. 
 
If earnings quality provides useful information regarding future stock returns, would 
accruals have predictive power for stock returns? While focusing on accounting 
accruals, Chan et al.’s (2006) findings confirm Sloan’s (1996) findings that accruals 
















Given Sloan’s (1996) conclusion that a long-short strategy on high-low earnings 
quality shares would yield positive, abnormal returns, it would be logical to assume 
that market participants would engage in such strategies.  
 
Richardson (2003), examined whether investors engage in the short-selling of listed 
firms with high accruals in order profit for the predictable lower future returns (as per 
Sloan 1996). The sample Richardson (2003) used is of US traded firms from 1990 to 
1998. The obvious criticism here is that the data is old, and possibly things have 
changed.  
 
Surprisingly, his findings indicated that investors engaged in short-selling did not do 
so on the informational content of accruals. The interpretation of this is either 
“investors are ignoring important information” or the more likely conclusion that it is 
more expensive and far riskier to short-sell firms that exhibit high accruals. 
 
In terms of this risk Richardson (2003) notes that firms exhibiting high accruals 
tended to have low book-market ratios and high sales growth as well as smaller 
market capitalisations. Because short-sellers carry unlimited risk on the upside, they 
would be nervous of shorting shares that have the potential for continued high 
growth. In addition, small market capitalisation shares tend to have lower liquidity 
which would in all likelihood make it too costly for short sellers to engage in the 
appropriate strategies. These factors might explain the Richardson (2003) findings 
that short-sellers do not exploit the information contained in accruals.  
 
This preference for liquidity is supported by Desai et al (2006) who test the effects of 
firm size on short sellers’ preferences with respect to accruals. Desai et al (2006) find 
that in firms with larger market capitalisation and therefore greater liquidity, there is a 
greater propensity for short-sellers to trade on the basis of the level of a firm’s 
accruals / earnings quality. This is consistent with short-sellers preference, in 
general, for more liquid stocks as this reduces the likelihood of a short squeeze. 
 
Richardson (2003) looks at the earnings restatements of both Enron and Worldcom. 
Richardson (2003) shows that in spite of the high level of accruals in the late 1990’s, 
there is no evidence of short selling in anticipation of the problems associated with 
high levels of accruals. Richardson (2003) concludes that short-selling is only evident 














traded and well covered by analysts, Richardson (2003) concludes that costs would 
not have been an inhibiting factor for short selling. 
 
By documenting the absence of a relationship between short sales and accruals, this 
paper provides further evidence to support the prior findings that the market does not 
factor in earnings quality information fully. 
Evidence of short activity in firms with poor earnings quality? 
 
An interesting study by Desai et al (2006) investigated how short-sellers behaved 
over the periods that firms make public and acknowledge material errors in their 
previously reported financial statements.  Desai et al (2006) ask the question as to 
whether short sellers use accounting information in order to aid their identification of 
short-selling targets. Put another way, does poor earnings quality attract short 
selling? 
 
The Desai et al (2006) paper looks to answer the following questions: i) Does the 
questionable financial reporting prompt short-selling; ii) Is there evidence of positions 
being taken by short-sellers ahead of the announcement of earnings restatements?; 
iii) Does the magnitude of the accruals affect short-selling?; iv) Does the degree of 
short interest pre- earnings restatements assist in predicting the subsequent (poor) 
performance of restating firms. 
 
The results for the first two questions are as follows: short positions are taken up 
ahead of earnings restatements and these are initiated several months prior to such 
restatements. The research of Desai et al (2006) suggests that the motive for short 
selling appears to be related to questionable accounting practices and that these are 
identified by short-sellers prior to the public disclosure of such practices. This 
contradicts Bradshaw et al (2001) “… that the market, on average, and other 
informed market participants, such as analysts and auditors, fail to detect (or choose 
to ignore) such practices.” 
 
As to the magnitude of accruals, the authors find that the greater the accruals the 
higher the increase in short interest prior to the restatement announcement. 
Decomposing accruals into its components, the authors show that short sellers are 














Combining these findings indicates that short sellers do target firms with low quality 
earnings.  
 
Lastly, the study by Desai et al (2006) shows that where firms have attracted high 
levels of short interest prior to an earnings restatement tend to exhibit lower returns 
post the announcement and tend to exhibit a higher chance of delisting due to 
performance related issues. 
 
The authors provide a useful comparison to Richardson’s (2003) study discussed in 
the previous section of this paper. Desai et al  (2006) show that isolate their sample 
to firms that are known, ex post, to have poor earnings quality and then study the 
short-selling behaviour. Richardson (2003) in contrast, uses a large sample of all 
firms on US stock exchanges to examine the relationship betwee  accruals and 
short-selling, The difference being that in the broader sample, other factors might 
impact the motivation for short selling, or at least reduce the impact of the influence 
of accruals on short interest.  
 
A criticism of the data used by Desai et al  (2006)  is that it is for a short period and is 
a small sample. The original sample consisted of 919 restatements between 01 
January 1997 and 30 June 2002. After exclusions, final sample totalled 477. The 
authors also recognise that because the sample is chosen ex post there is a potential 
for selection bias and therefore it is not clear whether the results can be generalised.  
 
Another point worth noting is that most literature focuses on current operating 
accruals. However, both Richardson (2003) and Desai et al (2006) include cash 
flows from investing activities (CFI). CFI includes accruals resulting from capital 
investments in physical assets or in intangible assets (e.g. software development 
costs). Richardson et al (2005) show that investing accruals, such as non-current 
operating asset accruals, are less reliable and are associated with lower earnings 
persistence and exhibit greater mispricing.   
Insider trading and earnings quality 
 
Managers of firms are in the position to make changes to both accounting or to 
operations that can affect the quality of earnings. These changes can be with the 
intent to mislead investors: manipulate the numbers to mislead investors about poor 
performance, or to provide a better reflection of the economic reality of a firm and the 














than the general market and any trades by them should act as a signal as to the 
quality of their respective firms’ earnings.  
This begs the question, does the trade by insiders provide any indication as to 
earnings quality? With this as the backdrop, Beneish and Vargus (2002) build on the 
Sloan (1996) research and show that insider trading information is useful in ex ante 
identifying the likely persistence (quality) of firms’ income-increasing accruals. 
Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that the market does not misprice income-increasing 
accruals that are accompanied by insider buying – a signal of good persistence of 
earnings by insiders. However, consistent with, and adding to, the Sloan (1996) 
finding, the market misprices high-accrual firms even where there is insider selling. 
Specifically, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that the trades of the top five executives 
of a firm provide the best signal with respect to the persistence of earnings quality 
and therefore the best signal to earn abnormal excess returns.  
The concept of information asymmetry is utilised by Aboody et al (2005), with 
earnings quality as a proxy for information asymmetry, to investigate whether 
privately informed traders (insiders) earn abnormal excess returns where earnings 
quality is a significant risk factor. Earnings quality is defined as the absolute value of 
the abnormal component of accruals, i.e. the discretionary component. This is used 
because these are the accruals more likely to be affected by management discretion 
(manipulation) and therefore is less likely to be in the public domain prior to results 
announcements.  In order to measure insider trading they examined all trades (both 
buy and sell transactions) by corporate insiders (officers, directors, and principal 
stockholders) that are subsequently publicly disclosed to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) from January 1985 to November 2003.  
Once again, the results are more pronounced on the buy-side of the transactions 
where the corporate insiders earned abnormal excess returns in low quality earnings 
firms. The weak results pertaining to insiders’ selling (in the form of smaller, 
insignificant profits) is explained by the authors as follows: typically corporate 
insiders would have much of their wealth tied up in firms in terms of stock. Their 
motivation to sell then is more due to diversification or consumption reasons, rather 
than profit motive driven by non-public information. This supports the Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) interpretation that investors do not seem to understand or factor in the 
signals relating to earnings quality when there is insider selling. Beneish and Vargus 
(2002) also attribute this to the undiversified nature of typical corporate insiders’ 














motivation for insider selling is difficult to isolate. Investors cannot interpret whether 
the selling is for an anticipated poor future performance of the firm, or more due to 
















The level of accruals are a reflection of the quality of earnings of a firm. This is true 
for whatever level of granularity, from current asset accruals, to abnormal accruals, 
to all accruals including non-current operating asset accruals.  The review of the 
prominent literature on the topic of earnings quality all point to this “accrual anomaly” 
-  that firms that exhibit high (low) accruals in one period tend to have a high (low) 
rate of return in that same period, but are likely to experience significant reductions 
(increases) in their rates of return in the subsequent period.  
 
Given that earnings tend to affect valuations, it follows that companies with high 
accruals will have low quality earnings and therefore would have a negative impact 
on the valuation of the company. The literature reviewed indicates that this is indeed 
the case. These reversion effects have been found occur in periods ranging from 
immediately after an earnings announcement, to quarterly, and up to a year after a 
results release. 
 
Accounting conservatism can also affect earnings quality. Conservative methods of 
accounting result in more capital allocation being recognized up front. Therefore 
returns in the early part of a project will appear lower and in the latter stages of a 
project will expand. Therefore ROA in the first few years of a project will be biased 
downwards, which will appear to negatively impact earnings quality initially, with 
stronger returns towards the latter stages of a project. 
 
Other areas where the earnings quality of a firm can be affected include 
management window dressing/ manipulation, business decisions, level of gearing, 
the nature of the company (how firm is positioned in an industry)  or the nature of an 
industry (cyclical versus non-cyclical). 
 
Given the evidence of the “accrual anomaly”, that investors treat the accrual 
component as if it is more persistent and the cash flow component as if it is less 
persistent, a trading strategy of taking long positions in shares that has low accruals 
and short positions in shares with high accruals should generate positive, abnormal 
returns. The literature suggests that this should be the case, that accruals are 
negatively correlated to future share price returns. However, studies into what occurs 














One of the reasons for this is liquidity constraints; high accrual companies have a 
tendency to have lower market capitalisations. The other is that it can prove too 
costly to short-sell high-accrual shares as these tend to have high growth rates. The 
risk here is that the firm exhibits continued, longer than expected growth to which 
short-sellers have unlimited upside risk exposure.  
 
It appears that the crux of the question as to whether earnings quality is a good 
investment indicator is that the market is unable to process accounting information. 
Market participants seem to extrapolate historic information into the future, ignoring 
what the accounting data is informing them. Therefore, high accruals (low quality 
earnings) are expected by the market to continue with no regard for mean reversion 
or the common business sense that should be applied for it, let alone the abundant 
evidence in financial literature to the contrary. 
 
This “anchoring” or fixation by investors does seem to the cause of the abnormal 
returns that can be earned by anticipating this behavioural bias whether it be by 




Further work in this topic would be a replication of the studies mentioned in this 
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